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This article analyses those imperialist and national discourses that the Chinese and the British 
constructed, particularly during the May Fourth Movement, in China in the 1910s and 1920s. 
Moreover, the paper explores the form, content, and impact of May Fourth rhetoric on national 
identity, concentrating on the cultural, historical, and political dimensions of nationalism presented 
in China. It is clear that the May Fourth protestors, especially urban and educated men, dominated 
public articulations of national identities. With their control of knowledge production, and in some 
cases control of state bureaucracies, elite men were able to make demands for the nation, often 
combining their own group needs with specific definitions of the nation. British discourse that was 
constructed during the May Fourth Movement responded to a reality that was infinitely adaptable 
in its function of preserving the basic structures of imperial power. For the British, the May Fourth 
demonstrators represented a potential change in the level of existing intellectual, political, social, 
and economic stability, which for decades had guaranteed the British a privileged position in the 
country. As result, discussions on nationalism and imperialism became a crucial part of the Sino-
British May Fourth Movement discourse.
INTRODUCTION
On May fourth in 1919, around 3,000 university students gathered together at Tiananmen Square 
in Beijing and started a series of demonstrations that would later be named the May Fourth 
Movement (Wusi Yundong). The demonstrators distributed flyers declaring that the Chinese 
could not accept the concession of Chinese territory to Japan, as stipulated at the Versailles Peace 
Conference held in the spring of 1919. Protests, demonstrations, and strikes spread throughout 
the capital and, over the next few weeks, across the entire country. (Chow 1980: 84–144) During 
the following months, Chinese students drafted manifestos, protested on the streets, and were 
regularly sent to jail, where they faced prosecution. Finally they mobilised nationwide support 
from workers and merchants, and thus they discovered their mission as permanent persuaders. 
The emergent political and social awareness, mixed with radical nationalism, led to widespread 
protests that would alter the political culture and practice of student and elite groups. They seri-
ously threatened the imperial and national status quo regarding the established treaty ports used 
by the Westerners, Japanese, and Russians. Chinese nationalism was clearly reflected in various 
representations of the May Fourth Movement, which displayed concerns for the linked themes of 
internal unification, international position, and a common Chinese culture.
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The British community had over seventy years of history in China, as the blueprint for the 
treaty-port system was drafted already in the Treaty of Nanjing, signed in 1842. According to 
the treaty, five Chinese ports – namely Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Guangzhou 
– were initially opened to British trade. Other Western countries were quick to sign similar trea-
ties with China, and these agreements shaped political and commercial relations between the 
Western countries and China for the next century, as numerous other cities were soon opened 
to trade.1 The treaties allowed foreigners to live and work in these treaty ports. In Shanghai, 
foreigners were able to rent land within the borders of municipalities named the International 
Settlement, French Concession, and the (Chinese) Municipality of Greater Shanghai. Moreover, 
the treaties supported and protected foreign missionaries, officials, and merchants when they 
travelled along rivers. (Airaksinen 2005: 34–40) In 1920, there were around 470 million inhab-
itants in China; out of these, approximately 326,000 were foreigners. Shanghai was the largest 
expatriate community, with over 60,000 foreigners. Among the foreigners living in China at the 
turn of the twentieth century, the British were the most active and influential, and British influ-
ence was more visible in Shanghai than anywhere else in China. They were deeply involved in 
contemporary politics and eager to protect their national interests in the country, and accord-
ingly, the May Fourth political activities were a matter of great concern.
The Chinese were faced with multiple imperial nationalisms at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. First, the foreign Qing dynasty had imposed imperial nationalism on China since 
its establishment in the seventeenth century. Secondly, Euro-American imperial nationalism 
had been enforced since the Opium Wars. Finally, China was influenced by Japanese imperial 
nationalism, which came into play after the Twenty-One Demands were introduced in 1915.2 
This article analyses discourses on imperialism and nationalism constructed by the Chinese 
and British, particularly during the May Fourth Movement. Accordingly, the work will also 
address the interaction between the Chinese and foreigners and the impact of this interaction 
on the development of the May Fourth Movement, as well as the national rhetoric expressed by 
the Chinese and the British. The discourse on May Fourth nationalism was a component in the 
construction of Chinese nationalism, which produced manifold local and global meanings. The 
article will explore both Chinese and British May Fourth nationalism through the contemporary 
political culture that predominated in China. If we accept the hypothesis that national identity 
has five dimensions – psychological, cultural, historical, political, and territorial (Guibernau 
2007: 11–32) – this paper concentrates on an analysis of the cultural, historical, and political 
domains of nationalism. First, the May Fourth Movement is discussed as event. Secondly, the 
British imperial presence and national rhetoric in China is analysed. Finally, Chinese nation-
alism during the May Fourth period will come under scrutiny. The May Fourth Movement 
itself has already been explored as an instrument for early Chinese nationalism (see Chow 
1980; Schwarcz 1986). Moreover, the development of modern Chinese nationalism has been 
thoroughly addressed by researchers (see Lin 1979; Mitter 2004). Thus, this article specifically 
seeks to illustrate the unique local Sino-British understanding of nationalism and imperialism 
that culminated in Shanghai as a particular result of the May Fourth Movement. This unique 
reconciliation provided a model for further negotiations of national identities throughout China.
1 Western countries included, for example, France, Germany, America, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands.
2 The Twenty-One Demands were a group of requests presented by the Japanese government to China in January 
1915 to extend Japanese economic and political influence over Manchuria and China.
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THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT AS EVENT
The inauguration of the Versailles Peace Conference reactivated the patriotic spirit among 
the Chinese intelligentsia. As a direct result of secret treaties that had been drafted between 
Western countries and Japan during WWI, it was decided to cede the former German empire’s 
imperial holdings in the Shandong peninsula to China’s archenemy Japan. From the Chinese 
perspective, therefore, the secret treaties failed to respect China’s sovereignty and the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919 was a complete betrayal of the “Wilsonian principles”;3 already disappointed 
young Chinese intellectuals were infuriated. Thus, international politics in Europe intensified 
anti-Japanese sentiment in China, while disillusionment with the political disintegration of 
warlord China reflected weakened state authority. Finally, the pro-Japanese ministers in the 
Chinese central government and their perceived “betrayal of the country” to Japanese milita-
rists galvanised the students for the May Fourth protests. At this point, all the ingredients for 
a radical movement were visible, and international and domestic politics prompted the May 
Fourth incident in Beijing. (Chow 1980)
Thousands of students from different Beijing universities hit the streets to demonstrate against 
the Treaty of Versailles, and many activists were arrested by the police. News of the demonstra-
tions, and particularly the protesting students’ arrests, quickly spread throughout the country. Many 
newspapers published editorials demanding that the students should be released. Before long, 
protests along similar lines as those in Beijing broke out in a number of other large cities, such as 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Guangzhou. Moreover, labour strikes were organised during the 
summer of 1919. Shops began to close, making the situation tense. Some Japanese residents were 
attacked and Japanese goods were boycotted. (Wasserstrom 1991: 31–71)
The emergent political and social awareness was mixed with radical nationalism. The result 
was widespread protests, which altered the political culture and practice of student and estab-
lished elite groups. Disturbances continued, more or less, until the Beijing government agreed 
to some of the protestors’ demands and decided that the arrested students would be released. 
Three cabinet officials were also dismissed and the entire cabinet handed in its resignation. 
In Versailles, the Chinese delegation stated that it was not willing to sign the Peace Treaty. 
Arguments over the Shandong problem continued for three more years, and it was only at the 
Washington Conference in 1921–1922 that the issue was finally settled and Japan withdrew its 
territorial claim.4
The May Fourth Movement initiated a patriotic outburst of new urban intellectuals against 
Japanese imperialists and Chinese warlords. These intellectuals identified the political establish-
ment with China’s failure in the modern era, and hundreds of new periodicals published critiques 
of Chinese traditions, turning instead to foreign ideas and ideologies. The movement split into 
leftist and liberal wings. The latter advocated gradual cultural reform as exemplified by Hu Shih, 
who interpreted the pragmatism of American philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952), while leftists 
3 US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points were composed in 1918 to support post-war sentiments of 
nationalism and democracy.
4 The Washington Conference was convened by the US to tackle many political questions left after the Versailles 
Peace Conference and to establish military balance in the Pacific.
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introduced Marxism and advocated political action.5 The movement also popularised vernacular 
literature and promoted educational reforms and political participation by women.
Chow Tse-tsung’s classic work on the May Fourth Movement illustrates the important 
impact of foreign events on the developments of the movement. However, his central objective 
is to develop an extensive analysis of social, political, and cultural aspects related only to the 
incident itself. (Chow Tse-tsung 1980) Reflecting another perspective, Joseph Chen (1971: 
1–39) underlines the differences between the movements in Beijing and Shanghai. He bases his 
notions on dissimilarities in the demographic, social, and economic structures of Beijing and 
Shanghai, respectively, and accordingly, how the May Fourth Movement developed differently 
in the two cities. Shanghai was a more modern, Western-oriented treaty port with influen-
tial international communities, and it had vital elements of commercialism and industrialism. 
However, Chen does not discuss the influence of foreigners on the movement’s ideologies 
and activities. Indeed, in Shanghai the students were able to escape the Chinese government’s 
suppressive measures by establishing offices and publishing houses inside the foreign-admin-
istered areas. Due to poor co-operation between the International Settlement and the French 
Concession, prohibition in one area did not lead to interruptions of operations in another. The 
students just simply crossed the border.
The May Fourth Movement’s ideological backgrounds were closely connected to the New 
Culture Movement, which had developed by the mid-1910s among the Chinese intelligent-
sia.6 The New Culture Movement extended and popularised a socially critical outlook, and it 
added to the surge of intellectuals exploring foreign “-isms”. The disillusioning outcome of the 
First World War’s peace-making had stirred a consciousness of China’s vulnerability and the 
urgency of action to bring it out of its backwardness. However, various distinctive features of 
the movements separated them. The New Culture Movement was more ideologically cultural, 
non-political, and intellectual, whereas the May Fourth Movement was born out of protests 
against global politics in Versailles. Furthermore, it catalysed many classes of Chinese society. 
The May Fourth Movement of 1919 has, in retrospect, been perceived as the core of anti-
Christian and anti-foreign movements, as well as the beginning of women’s emancipation 
and radical nationalism. It is also said to have provided the ideological basis of the Chinese 
Communist Party. The May Fourth Movement is also consistently referred to in explanations 
of the backgrounds of the great Chinese movements during the twentieth century (for example, 
the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956–1957), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), and the 
Tiananmen Square Democracy Movement (1989)). (Hughes 2006: 13, 52–53).
Sidney Tarrow (1994: 3–4) has appropriately defined a movement in general as a collective 
challenge by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with the elite, 
opponents, and authorities. It is worth noting that Chinese students who had been studying abroad 
already had some experience of participating and even organising movements. Also, an experi-
ence of united labour strikes had been gained in Europe when Chinese workers were sent into 
5 Hu Shih (1891–1962) was a philosopher, essayist and, in his later life, a diplomat. A leading liberal intellec-
tual in the May Fourth Movement, his most significant contribution was the promotion of vernacular literature 
to replace the classical style of writing. Hu Shih was also a leading critic and analyst of traditional Chinese 
culture and thought. He was ambassador to the United States (1938–1942), Chancellor of Beijing University 
(1946–1948), and after 1958 President of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan.
6 The New Culture Movement was born among the Chinese intelligentsia already in 1915 as a means to support 
literary reform. It emphasised self-transformation of the nation by rejecting traditional Confucian principles and 
fostering Western ideologies.
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factories to replace the labour force fighting in WWI. Apparently, these Chinese workers were 
actively involved in the strikes. Nevertheless, the May Fourth Movement presented a challenge 
for the Chinese to recognise their common interests and to translate them into collective action. 
As it turned out, the magnitude of activities was comparable to no other contemporary movement.
BRITISH NATIONALISM FACING THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT
Politically and financially, the most powerful British group was made up of businessmen, 
including traders, bankers, manufacturers and the managers of mines, shipping industries, and 
railways. Other major groups consisted of British governmental and municipal officials and 
missionaries. Another significant sector in the British community was made up of miscella-
neous groups that provided services at the treaty port settlements; these included, for example, 
journalists, lawyers, teachers, real estate agents, shopkeepers, and engineers.
Although the British were outsiders in China, they had been able to create their own 
municipal administration (for example, in Shanghai’s International Settlement), together with 
other Western countries and Japan. In Shanghai, the British had founded a strong municipal 
government led by the Shanghai Municipal Council (“the Council”), which was responsible 
for public utilities and security, but in reality controlled the whole foreign community. It was 
a committee of nine annually elected members (often six British, two Americans, and one 
Japanese), usually chaired by a British member. These members were frequently managers 
of large companies (such as the Jardine, Matheson & Company, Butterfield and Swire, or the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), elected to the Council at the annual Ratepayers 
General Meeting. Maintenance of this peculiar oligarchy was secured by an electoral system 
that was based on property franchise; it was a limited franchise in which only the wealthiest 
businessmen had the privilege to vote. The Council believed that administratively it was respon-
sible only to the ratepayers of the Settlement. (Kotenev 1925: 561–564)
Another exceptional feature of the Council was its ability to operate without deriving its 
powers from the legislative assembly of any government, as much of its legitimacy was estab-
lished on a code of local laws that had been implemented using the foreign nations’ extra-
territorial laws.7 The Council had no internationally recognised judicial power, and hence its 
hegemony was based on incoherent land regulations and subsequently added by-laws (Land 
Regulations and By-Laws 1923). The Council ruled the International Settlement by means of 
twelve different departments and employed over 600 people, the great majority being British 
residents. In addition, the foreign settlement had its own mixed court for disputes between 
foreigners and Chinese. The Shanghai Municipal Police were used to secure the safety of the 
area, while in times of emergency – such as during the May Fourth Movement – the police 
were assisted by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. With the assistance of its various organisations, 
the Council’s power of policing and taxation asserted sovereignty over the municipality and 
the population, foreign or Chinese. Moreover, the Council increasingly dictated foreigners’ 
attitudes towards the Chinese and, accordingly, towards the May Fourth activities. (Shanghai 
Municipal Archives 1920, U1-3-1, Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council)
A primary objective of British foreign policy was to create a world market economy based 
on free trade, freedom of movement for capital, and a unified international monetary system. 
7 According to extraterritorial laws the immigrants remained subjected to the laws of their own country instead 
of Chinese laws. Thus, foreigners were subjects of their own consular jurisdiction.
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Therefore, the relationship between economics and politics was a key issue in British relations 
with China. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Americans and Japanese had intensi-
fied their influence in China, whereas WWI had drained Britain, leaving her struggling with her 
own domestic and imperial problems. It was obvious that the rise of British economic power in 
the nineteenth century and the feeling of superiority, which spread simultaneously with indus-
trial progress at home and the expansion of territory abroad, were gradually weakening in 
China. In order to perpetuate her established position within the economic and political spheres 
of influence in China, Britain had to perform. From this perspective, British interests were less 
important in terms of the domestic economy than in terms of the regional supremacy that they 
represented in Asia. The war had offered a welcome boost for British sales in the East, yet the 
Armistice had also brought a sharp cut in market prices. In spite of diminishing government 
exports to China, British companies’ investments in property, land, industry, commerce, and 
banking guaranteed their authority in the municipality administration of treaty ports. British 
investments helped support her dominant position in China, since almost a third of foreign 
investment was British. Stocks, land, buildings, and factories often financed by Chinese, British, 
and other foreigners were primary components of the contemporary investor’s portfolio. Out of 
all land owned by the Chinese, over 80% of foreign-registered properties in the International 
Settlement were held by the British, while half of the real-estate value in the French Concession 
was nominally in their name. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, HSBC Holdings 
plc, Group Archives, Shanghai Managerial Correspondence 1919–1921; Clifford 1991: 41–47) 
In 1920, foreign trade statistics show that Britain and its crown colony Hong Kong had combined 
imports to China of 36.4%, with exports being 33.7% (Chinese Maritime Customs 1921: 7). 
The British merchants exercised control over this business.
In order to illustrate the development of the British nationalistic project in China, we have 
to discuss the British sense of “self” in contrast to “other” and the ways in which these were 
portrayed in China. At the beginning of the twentieth century, British settlers in China carefully 
constructed their own national identity – which at times coincided with the rise of Chinese 
radical nationalism. British contact with the Chinese naturally involved identification, differ-
entiation, sameness and otherness, and desire and attraction as well as dislike. To understand 
British national rhetoric during the May Fourth Movement, it is important to analyse the 
language that they used. Because multiple political, economic, and religious interests can be 
interpreted in this language, looking at the British manifestos we need to analyse the authorised 
language that they created and used to communicate their objectives and interests during the 
May Fourth period. The language was part of an activity by means of which the British attempted 
to define national identity and to control other community members and their understanding 
of it. Moreover, the language provided tools to legitimise the British presence and policies. 
(Jardine, Matheson and Corporation Archives, twentieth century correspondence) Authorised 
language is interpreted by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu as a symbolic power that is exercised in 
order to acquire more concrete domination. Bourdieu (1991: 23, 107–116, 163–170) indicates 
that symbolic power is a linguistically expressed “invisible” power, which is often “misrecog-
nised” as such and, therefore, is “recognised” as legitimate. This requires that those subjected 
to it believe in the legitimacy of power and the legitimacy of those who wield it. Hegemony is 
in some sense conferred by those who obey, and authorised language is a relevant example of 
this. Bourdieu argues that “the symbolic power – as a power of constituting is defined in and 
through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, in the 
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very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced”. Bourdieu continues 
the discussion of how to implement symbolic power in society in order to sustain domination. 
Thus, the Council issued warnings and notifications to May Fourth demonstrators. In these 
notifications, protestors’ activities were condemned as a threat to the Land Regulations, which 
formed, from the British perspective, a legitimate basis for their foreign presence. Moreover, 
the Movement was perceived as an illegal act that threatened British national security and was 
therefore a “riot” or “rebellion” against the foreign authority. (Shanghai Municipal Archives 
1920, Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919: 46A, 75A) Threats to authority were 
a major concern for the British community, as the following letter indicates:
As you are aware Shanghai has, since I last wrote you at length, past [sic] through some trouble-
some times and the last has not been heard of them yet. We had the Students Demonstration over 
the Shantung question which eventually reached the proportions of the riot and necessitated the 
use of armed force to quell the disturbances. It is only fair to say that if the students had been able 
to control the situation, in all probability, no serious rioting would have taken place but once the 
demonstration was started it gave the opportunity to all the riff-raff and malcontents and loafers to 
join in and create trouble. The very fate, however, of the students demonstrations at all shows the 
trend of events in China and the inconvenience caused by the closing the shops and the striking 
employees in foreign employ showed the Chinese the power of “passive resistance” tactics and one 
may be sure in the future they will not be slow to avail themselves of the same means of attaining 
the ends. (China Association Circulars Feb. 1918 – Apr. 1920, nos 261–278)
British society in China as a whole produced and reproduced national rhetoric, which 
was established to support the existing socio-political order in the country. Thus, a textual 
personification of authority served particular group interests, which they tended to present 
as universal interests that should be shared by the people of China. The British emigrants 
contributed to the fictitious creation of a dominant class of foreigners by supporting the 
worldview that defined their existence. British national self-reflections included various 
dimensions of colonial encounters that were interpreted in correspondence, articles and reports. 
The British expatriates’ threefold identity – which consisted of local identity, British identity, 
and imperial identity – was undoubtedly reflected in propaganda materials and policies directed 
at the May Fourth demonstrators. The British local identity was reflected first in communal 
treaty-port politics, where “Britishness” defined people as part of the nation. Imperial identity 
dominated the understanding of Great Britain’s position as the world’s greatest colonial 
power. (Bickers 1999: 68–108) It was obvious that British observations reflected imperialist 
expressions of the surrounding society, which also mirrored preconceived British cultural and 
ethnic ideas and Protestant moral principles. This British political belief system had an impact 
on their decision-making behaviour. It reflected various social, class-based, and ethnic-oriented 
presumptions introduced in international relations, and thus constantly shaped and constrained 
policy choices. (North China Herald June–July 1919; Smith 1988: 32–35)
Having witnessed the Movement, British residents shared some collective perceptions which, 
in turn, reflected fears and expectations about their presence in China. At first, due to fears of 
spreading xenophobia associated with the May Fourth activities, serious attempts were made to 
delegitimise the Movement as an anti-foreign demonstration. Connections and similarities were 
drawn to the Boxers, who had attacked foreigners two decades earlier.8 Secondly, the British 
8 The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), as it was later named, was a peasant uprising in which the Chinese at-
tempted to drive foreigners out of China. It has been estimated that over 110,000 people were killed during the 
uprising, out of which around 250 were foreigners.
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community expressed the need to maintain peace and stability in the Settlement or in areas where 
they operated. Thirdly, they all had something “British” – or at least from their perspective it was 
characteristically British – to protect. The British education system and the principle of free trade, 
including free capital movements, were examples of British prestige in China. Moreover, respect 
for Western law and regulations were equated with British officials’ principal ideals of model 
society established in the International Settlement. The British assumption was for everyone to 
respect the Council’s authority, and accordingly they formed the rhetoric that emerged, which 
expressed common British, imperial, Western, and Christian values. In this way, the May Fourth 
discussions also created implicit collective rules for British communal behaviour. This cohesion 
within the British community included shared attitudes towards politics as an activity, and it also 
included the constant repetition of important words (Hunt 1984: 13–14).
As will be explored below, the sudden rise of Chinese radical nationalism was indeed a 
serious threat to foreign, and particularly British, hegemony in the International Settlement. 
For the British, the May Fourth demonstrators represented a potential change in the existing 
intellectual, political, social, and economic status quo, which for decades had guaranteed the 
British a privileged position in the treaty ports. 
CHINESE MAY FOURTH NATIONALISM
Following their British neighbours, the Chinese activists also created May Fourth rhetoric by 
means of which they could express their Movement’s values. This was done initially in order 
to transact with the British, but later it extended to the entire foreign community in China. 
The initial purpose was to maintain “cordial relations” with the British and to achieve the 
support of expatriates for their Chinese activities. In order to reach a wider audience, all printed 
materials targeted at foreigners were eloquently written, usually in English but also in French 
or in German when necessary. Obviously, when they directed the rhetoric to Chinese groups 
(such as officials, the business community, students, or other citizens) they wrote the texts in 
Chinese vernacular (baihua) or occasionally in classical Chinese (wenyan wen). The core of the 
national discussion was formed by Western concepts (for example, nationalism, liberalism, and 
democracy), which were re-interpreted to be able to operate in a contemporary Chinese context. 
Besides expressing prevalent local and national identities, May Fourth propaganda also intro-
duced certain class-related identities. It has been shown that the new urban elite attempted to 
challenge traditional political and social structures in order to modernise China. Similarly, it 
was inevitable that the May Fourth ideologies, as they began to express national sentiments, 
catalysed the radical wing of the bourgeoisie. May Fourth activities triggered the formation of 
a political consciousness among the new elite, who wanted a more influential position in the 
political sphere. Representation in the treaty-port political system appeared as an attractive 
option to the politically active elite. (Bergère 1989: 209–217; Luo 1920: 607–608)
Closely related to Chinese representation in the treaty-port administration question was the 
Chinese demand to abolish foreign extraterritorial rights in the International Settlement. This 
request was based on the international principle to guarantee countries’ national self-determina-
tion, as had been agreed after the war. Earlier in the spring of 1919, the Armistice had first been 
discussed by the Chinese intelligentsia, and students had been especially active in campaigning 
for its finalisation. Furthermore, President Wilson’s Fourteen Points were understood to oppose 
secret agreements, such as the one between Japan and Britain, which allowed the Japanese to 
assume the German position in China. However, in spite of some American activists’ support of 
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the May Fourth Movement and its ideology, the American government and president officially 
only offered their sympathies but never acutely considered co-operating with Chinese national-
ists to solve the country’s problems. (Wang 2005: 66–71; Zhang 1991: 76, 121)
Already in January 1919, Chinese merchant organisations had distributed circulars to mobi-
lise their groups to rally against such secret agreements. When the Chinese negotiators had 
refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, agitation to abrogate the special spheres of influence 
and extraterritorial rights immediately intensified. The British press, however, censured all 
claims that would endanger the current presence of foreigners in China. From the perspective 
of President Wilson’s principles, China had legitimate rights (for example, national post and 
telegram systems and autonomy of its customs tariff). According to the Chinese, the withdrawal 
of foreign police forces and an abolition of foreign concessions appeared to be a natural contin-
uation of this process. Modern Western rights – such as freedom of speech and of the press, 
and the right to public assembly – were regularly analysed, published in the newspapers, and 
distributed in pamphlets. (Chen 1971: 67; North China Herald July 1919) In reality, the whole 
May Fourth Movement had partly been created to actualise these ideals. For the most part, 
China’s societal change was the most urgent question; in order to achieve it, certain political 
changes, especially those related to the foreigners’ prerogatives in China, were necessary.
It is relevant to point out that the principles presented and accepted in the Washington 
Conference, reflecting the idea of a sovereign China as part of the international community, had 
already been presented in Beijing and Shanghai during the May Fourth demonstrations in the 
summer and autumn of 1919. The centre of the Movement had, however, moved to Shanghai 
after that city’s general strike. In Shanghai, the foreign areas were politically protected from 
Chinese central government control. To some extent, the growth of Chinese nationalism in the 
International Settlement was explicitly reflected in the agitation for Chinese representation 
in treaty-port administration. Just as an initial attempt to present national unity was taking 
place, protests against the press licence were provoked in order to maintain the May Fourth 
protagonists’ freedom to express opinions in the newspapers. Regardless of all these actions, 
there remained a lack of a well-defined national objective and, on the whole, Chinese responses 
to nationalist issues lacked consistency.
Anxiety levels between the foreign police authorities and the Chinese students had steadily 
intensified during the protests and strikes. This tense situation seems to have been recognised by 
the May Fourth activists, who attempted to defuse the strained atmosphere by placing student 
corps around the treaty ports to assist the police when necessary. Chinese traditional social 
discipline organisations – a corps was called a “group of ten” – were re-established to limit 
violence and disturbances.9 In spite of these efforts, however, some Japanese were assaulted 
and a few were even killed. Some other foreigners were also attacked. The May Fourth activ-
ists’ initial strategy to co-operate with foreign municipal officials was followed overall, and the 
May Fourth student forces perceived themselves to be as legitimate as the British authorities, 
but particularly when the student corps attempted to implement vigilante law, they were catego-
rised by the British as “a riotous group anxious to control the whole society”. The resulting 
situation produced friction, as the Chinese students failed to effectively communicate their 
political significance for the foreign oligarchy and the foreigners were unwilling to sacrifice 
9 The “group of ten” (or baojia) was a traditional household registration system. During the May Fourth 
Movement, such groups controlled crowds like the police force.
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their precious privileges in the treaty ports. Indeed, the British administration resisted any 
degree of Chinese control, while the Chinese student corps who patrolled the streets under-
mined British prestige. For the Chinese students, the May Fourth corps operated as an example 
of the students’ ability to supervise national activities. The treaty ports provided “a testing 
field” where various persuasive and coercive national campaigns could be experimented with 
and modified for future operations. (Shanghai Municipal Archives 1919, U1-91-19, Shanghai 
Municipal Police; Wasserstrom 1991: 72–92)
The May Fourth activists clearly proved that it was a matter of Chinese national pride to 
display strength and unity when they challenged foreign residents. The May Fourth Movement 
introduced a novel sense of modern national identity. Moreover, the activists had to find a way of 
dealing with Japanese and Western imperial political and cultural challenges, since the previous 
Chinese dynasties had humiliatingly failed to do so. This manifestation was particularly impor-
tant, as the Chinese often believed that foreigners did not take seriously their attempts to control 
the growing May Fourth Movement. More significantly, Japanese newspapers characterised the 
May Fourth Movement as a “five-minute patriotism” that was merely a renewal of previous 
short-lived and enthusiastic boycott attempts, which would die off as soon as activities threat-
ened Chinese merchants’ businesses or personal interests. Some British observers preferred to 
characterise it with patronising assumptions, predicting its imminent failure or calling it – as 
the British Consul-General did – “blind folly”. (Shanghai Municipal Archives 1920, U1-3-1, 
Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council)
In general, the May Fourth activists recognised those policies that fortified the sense of 
national honour that was crucial to the success of the Movement. In fact, all Chinese patri-
otic activities were perceived as essential in order to confront foreign treaty-port authorities. 
The expatriate community was not disposed to favour this view. The opposite, “saving face”, 
was instead recognised as a deeply embedded and negative characteristic in the psyche of the 
Chinese people. The British invented the concept of “face pidgin” to criticise the Chinese 
way of saving face and, accordingly, their status. (China Year Book 1921–1922: 547) In this 
regard, the May Fourth demonstrators’ demand to conduct a final flag-waving march through 
Shanghai’s International Settlement in order to celebrate the achievements of their strike was 
identified by the British as another attempt to usurp power. The victory parade was even more 
feared as an indicator of the foreign community’s defeat by Chinese nationalism. For the May 
Fourth protestors, the end of the general strike was the Movement’s first major victory and a 
powerful demonstration of Chinese patriotism. In addition, the Chinese merchants expected 
some moral acceptance of their boycott and strike activities, and they needed a victory parade 
after a symbolically and realistically successful strike. Instead, celebrating demonstrators 
received a hostile response from British municipal authorities. The patriotic and non-violent 
parade was condemned as “a riot of a belligerent mob” (Chen 1971: 167–172), a comment that 
revealed the nasty side of the British authorities. Contrary to all expectations within the Chinese 
community, the British rejected the parade. The qualities of “stiff upper lip” or “protecting 
Western values and principles” were the principles that the British expected to be respected by 
the May Fourth demonstrators. While the “stiff upper lip” or “Western values” mentalities were 
perceived as positive characteristics among British expatriates, and to some extent among the 
Chinese intelligentsia, the Chinese “face pidgin” disposition was seen as a weakness from the 
British perspective.
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Already in the summer of 1919, the students had addressed a letter to the Council, indicating 
their earnest desire to help “our foreign friends” in the treaty-port areas, and they attempted to 
assure British officials of their ability to guarantee peace and order in the region. Combined with 
this message, the students appointed a special committee to promote understanding between 
May Fourth demonstrators and foreigners. Even before launching the general strike, the Chinese 
Citizens’ Society had issued an explanatory letter to several foreign officials. It articulated the 
objectives of boycotting Japanese products, and moreover it promised to advise all Chinese to 
purchase their goods only from British and American shops. This rhetoric, which overwhelm-
ingly praised foreigners, was put forth in notices issued by Chinese student, merchant, and 
educational organisations. A substantial number of these texts complimented the whole foreign 
community’s sympathy and goodwill towards the Movement. Brief references were made to the 
exceptional organisational skills of the May Fourth demonstrators to maintain order during the 
strikes. (North China Herald June 1919) Despite skilfully constructed discourse on “Western 
friends”, the notices were in fact used as instruments for the May Fourth activists to garner 
common acceptance among foreigners and Chinese.
In another message, the British were reminded in a highly articulate manner of their position as 
guardians of the Chinese Maritime Customs and as administrators of many foreign settlements in 
the country.10 Overall, along with these concessions, they had responsibilities towards the whole 
country. According to this hypothesis, by supporting the Chinese nation against imperialist Japan, 
the British would guarantee in the future the continuation of their privileged presence in China. This 
was an obvious indication that the British imperial hegemony was accepted and even supported 
by the Chinese activists. As one May Fourth pamphlet indicated, the only way for the British to 
maintain a powerful hegemony was to help the demonstrators in their operations against Japanese 
aggression. In another, it was implied that the Japanese would simply remove the British from the 
treaty ports. (Shanghai Municipal Archives 1919, U1-91-19, Shanghai Municipal Police)
The May Fourth students claimed that they were fighting for foreigners in China. Their messages 
repeated the rhetoric of the Western principle of the democratic right to protest when encountering 
imperialist aggression. Their notices implied that the Japanese, not the Chinese, were hostile agents 
and were gradually forcing the British out of the treaty ports in order to openly practise militarist 
politics in China. By including in the letters a goal of co-operation to resist Japanese aggression, 
the May Fourth demonstrators sought to establish a high level of co-existence and shared values 
and interdependence – both perceived and actual – between the British and Chinese. It seems as 
if the British and the May Fourth activists’ collaboration to fight against a mutual enemy was a 
fundamental requirement in these political and financial contexts. Another point to stress is that 
the demonstrators’ discourse repeatedly expressed well-known Western values such as democracy, 
free trade, nationalism, liberalism, general education, and women’s emancipation. Underlying this 
reasoning was the idea that the British would understand and support a movement which repre-
sented modern ideologies similar to their own. (Schwarcz 1986: 94–144)
In the summer of 1919, the Shanghai Municipal Council issued various notifications to restrict 
the May Fourth activities, and finally it closed the students’ office in the Settlement. Apart from 
losing this perfect site for their headquarters, the May Fourth activists’ operations did not seem 
to be greatly affected by the Council’s notifications. The Council’s first order to not interfere 
10 Until 1912, the Chinese Maritime Customs (1854–1949) was called the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. 
It was a Chinese governmental tax collection agency and information service predominantly controlled by the 
British.
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with shopkeepers’ businesses was ignored by the student and merchant inspector corps and the 
“groups of ten”, who investigated business premises in order to find prohibited Japanese products. 
A second notification called for an end to the distribution of potentially inciting printed mate-
rials, but stemming the constant flow of such propaganda proved unmanageable. The Shanghai 
Municipal Police reported that it consisted of over 500 different kinds of handbills and cartoons. 
Other than preventing some parades, the third notification to stop rumours and crowd gatherings 
was also fairly ineffective. The rush gained from political and social agitation was thrilling, and it 
was impossible to prevent people from gathering together to exchange stories and experiences and 
predictions of future events. In reality, since the strikes had closed schools, shops, and factories, 
people had nothing else to do except to meet on the streets and talk about the situation. Increasing 
numbers of people crowded the streets to listen to speakers on the corners. (Shanghai Municipal 
Archives 1920, Shanghai Municipal Council, Annual Report 1919: 88A)
Printed materials that were produced for foreigners were compiled skilfully, while visual 
images were designed to support the Movement’s nationalist ideology. Modern styles and accu-
rate analyses expressed through Western models demonstrated the May Fourth protagonists’ 
abilities to produce rational and intelligent ideas. This created some unease among foreign 
circles and gave an extra impetus for British authorities to suppress the Movement as soon 
as possible. (Shanghai Municipal Archives 1920, U1-3-1, Minutes of Shanghai Municipal 
Council) The May Fourth activists represented a modern, active, and educated new Chinese 
generation that could easily contest British imperial privileges and rights. By using their posi-
tion, Chinese scholars were able to bring considerable pressure to bear on more reluctant 
patriots, such as workers or merchants. It was still possible to leverage the traditional Chinese 
respect for scholars, and the recent general strike had shown the scholars’ potential to unify all 
classes in support of the Movement.
In a contrast of style, in May Fourth propaganda disseminated among Chinese inhabitants, 
short sentences and vernacular language were used to promote ideas. Easily memorable phrases 
were repeated in order to underline the principles of the Movement: “Down with militarists”, 
“China belongs to Chinese”, and “Boycott Japanese goods” were some of the popular slogans 
used to deliver their message. (Shanghai Municipal Archives 1919, U1-91-19, Shanghai 
Municipal Police; Smith 2002: 92–108) The difference between the rhetoric addressed to 
foreigners and Chinese intelligentsia on one hand and common Chinese people on the other 
was massive. The former groups clearly needed more “eloquent argumentation”. Accordingly, 
May Fourth propaganda reflected different target audiences.
Side by side with this rhetorical co-operation with the British, Western-educated students 
comprised a critical faction of the Chinese intellectuals who had already begun to criticise 
British hegemony in the country. Hence, the first attempts to contest Britain’s semi-colonial 
presence were expressed during the May Fourth Movement. Western-style pamphlets were 
drafted and political meetings were held to support the right to pursue Chinese national inde-
pendence and to organise popular movements to implement it. (Students’ Movement. China 
Press 13 July 1919: 2)
The Chinese May Fourth rhetoric on nationalism was established first and foremost to 
advocate the Chinese constituency and, secondly, to convince Westerners of their ideological 
seriousness. Given the remarkably broad level of participation in the Movement, it is unreason-
able to assume that the actors were all inspired by a single ideology. For foreigners, directed 
manifestos and concepts were adopted from socialism, anarchism, Darwinism, Marxism, 
13Tiina H. Airaksinen: Imperialism and Nationalism as May Fourt Movement Discourses
Studia Orientalia Electronica 2 (2014): 1–15
Communism, Bolshevism, and liberalism. These ideologies, being reasonably new in China, 
were frequently expressed in conjunction with the rejection of traditional Chinese values. 
(Chen 1922: 648–649; Hu Shih 1934) It is indisputable that the May Fourth rhetoric contained 
contradictory elements. On one hand, it provoked a profound critique of traditional Chinese 
culture, while on the other hand it advocated radical Chinese nationalism. In addition, Western 
modernism was admired. This was interpreted as a conflict between external imperatives of 
“national salvation” (jiuguo) and internal prerequisites of “enlightenment” (qimeng) (Schwarcz 
1986: 1–10). As the students asserted:
We, as students, would never be able, would never dare to assert that we had reached enlighten-
ment, that we are, ourselves, enlightened enough. We have, however, made up our minds to search 
for enlightenment. We hope that other people in our society will also become determined to march 
toward enlightenment. (Schwarcz 1986: 137)
At that time, Chinese modernisation was believed to be achievable through the adoption 
of particular Western doctrines. Yet, an anti-imperialist feeling was already condemning 
Japanese politics, and the Versailles Peace Treaty had undoubtedly increased reservations 
towards Westerners’ policies in China. However contradictory the objectives were, the radical 
nationalism urgently demanded change. The strong articulation of these ideals for the foreign 
audience had a profound impact on the development of May Fourth ideologies. In many cases, 
Chinese intellectuals – which included both students and teachers – were the major advocates 
of the May Fourth ideas to foreigners. This May Fourth discourse dominated intellectual 
discussions during the Movement.
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that Chinese nationalism was reflected in the various representations of the May 
Fourth Movement that displayed concerns for the linked themes of internal unification, inter-
national position, and a common Chinese culture. Obviously the participants sought to portray 
the Movement as nationalist, since demonstrations and strikes were often directed against the 
forces of imperialism. Presumably, this also had to do with attempts of the Communist Party 
and the nationalist Guomindang to strengthen the image of “the nationalistic spirit” of the 
Movement in later narrations that were used for their own purposes. Indeed, the May Fourth 
Movement comprised part of the political ceremonies and symbols related to China’s national 
awakening and identity building.
The British discourse constructed during the May Fourth Movement created and responded 
to a reality that was infinitely adaptable in its functions of preserving the basic structures of 
imperial power. The sudden rise of Chinese radical nationalism was indeed a serious threat to 
foreign, and particularly British, hegemony and imperialism in the treaty ports and the whole 
of China. For the British, the May Fourth demonstrators represented a potential change in the 
existing intellectual, political, social, and economic stability, which for decades had guaranteed 
the British a privileged position in the country. 
The ideas which the May Fourth Movement communicated to students were also evident 
among the Chinese bourgeoisie or the new urban elite, including merchants and businessmen. In 
the form of street and labour unions, their ideas also became accessible to workers in the facto-
ries. In addition to growing class distinctions during the May Fourth Movement, the greatest 
threat for the British municipal authorities was the May Fourth demonstrators’ ability to agitate 
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political consciousness among classes that had been traditionally excluded from power and, 
therefore, had usually been reluctant to join mass movements.
Moreover, the critical faction of the Chinese population – which included groups of students 
and intellectuals, but increasingly also sections of the bourgeoisie and workers – had started to 
analyse British hegemony in the country. Overall, new Chinese organisations reinterpreted the 
emerging resistance against domestic and foreign oppression in China, and during the life of the 
May Fourth Movement these groups expressed initial attempts to challenge the British semi-
colonial presence. As local newspaper reports revealed, for example, the press licence discussion 
prompted Chinese Western-educated students to accuse the entire law of being manufactured 
and implemented by the British in order to check growing Chinese public opinion. In addition, 
Westerners’ unfulfilled promises of treaty revisions provided a strong impetus for the rise of 
radical nationalism among the Chinese. The British inflexible policies towards the May Fourth 
Movement were partially responsible for the modern and radical fringe’s initial questioning of 
the Western, and particularly the British, position in China.
At that time, the May Fourth protestors, especially urban and educated men, dominated 
public articulations of national identities. With their control of knowledge production, and in 
some cases control of state bureaucracies, the cultural elite were able to make demands for 
the nation, often combining their own group needs with particular definitions of the nation 
itself. The Chinese search for equality in foreign relations was humiliatingly rejected during the 
Versailles Peace Treaty. Furthermore, humiliation and degradation of the country profoundly 
and specifically affected the students. For Chinese nationalists, the May Fourth Movement 
provided, at least to some extent, an opportunity to express patriotism towards their home 
country in foreign enclaves beyond the immediate reach of the Chinese government. It is 
apparent, therefore, that the successful May Fourth boycotts and strikes initiated permanent 
expansions in participation and provided the instruments for implementing radical activism that 
would be required for later movements.
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